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Democracy is necessarily and inevitably party government   
H. Kelsen, 1929, Vom Wesen und Wert der Democratie, p.20 
 
 [In ancient Athens] There were no parties in anything like the 
modern sense, either among the politicians or the public.  
Jones, 1957, p.131 
 
Abstract. Political parties, formal, durable and mass organizations which inform 
voters on public policy issues, nominate candidates for office and fight elections for 
the right to govern, are ubiquitous in modern representative democracies, but were 
absent from the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens. The paper 
investigates how the political institutions of Athens may explain their absence. The 
arguments explored include voter homogeneity; the conditions at the start of the 
democracy, characterized by single constituency configuration of the demos, simple 
majority voting and lack of organized groups; irrelevance of holding public office 
for determining public policy; appointment to public posts through sortition; and 
voting on single-dimension issues. The paper then discusses how in the absence of 
parties voters became informed and how political leaders were held accountable by 
the courts. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent research in institutional economics has augmented our understanding of the 
famous institutions of the direct democracy of Classical Athens (508-322 BCE). Equally, 
studying the Athenian institutions has provided valuable insights to the use and 
limitations of economic methodology.
1
 However, the literature has largely ignored a 
fundamental, and from a modern perspective, most peculiar characteristic of Athenian 
democratic politics, the absence of political parties. A political party is a group organized 
for electing candidates to office and for promoting a particular set of political principles.
2
 
Organizing political activity through parties solves a number of information and 
coordination problems in passing legislation. Contrary to representative government, in 
ancient Athens the central process of democracy was “the direct participation of ordinary 
people in collective self-governance” (Ober 2008a: 70). What explains the absence of 
political parties from ancient Athens? How did the Athenian democracy resolve the 
information and political accountability problems inherent in collective choice without 
party intermediation? The present study investigates these questions.  
Political parties are simultaneously organizations, that is, players within a given 
institutional setting, and institutions, that is, they impose rules of behaviour to members 
and voters alike.
3
 They emerge endogenously when they promote the self-interests of 
rational political decision-makers, politicians, policy demanders and voters. This implies 
that the wider institutions of collective decision making, the right to propose policy, 
occupy public office, vote, and the voting rule, affect incentives to form parties. Equally, 
parties operate internal rules for membership, finance, election of leadership, and 
adopting manifestos. The study focuses on an institutional explanation of the absence of 
parties from the Athenian direct democracy. 
                                                 
1
 Fleck and Hanssen (2018) recently review the application of economic methodology to 





 For the distinction between institutions and organizations see North (1990) and North et 
al (2009); for critical comments regarding the possible nexus between the two and the confusion 
surrounding this distinction, see Hodgson (2017). 
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It may be argued that concepts of modern parties could not apply to ancient Athens 
because it was a small-size polity where citizens voted directly on policies. Attica is 
about 3,800 Km
2
 large and in the fourth century the Athenian male only citizenry 
numbered 30,000 (Hansen 1999). Had the enfranchised citizens numbered in the 
hundreds of thousands, direct democracy would have been infeasible. There is an element 
of truth in this because in large populations spread over wide areas debating and voting in 
open meetings is almost impossible. However, an explanation based on small size cannot 
content the theorist as it is couched in casual observation. The Athenian direct democracy 
was not a haphazard gathering of crowds; it had established complex collective choice 
mechanisms, and large numbers of citizens occupied public posts performing delegated 
responsibilities. It embodied a rich array of institutions whose contribution ought to be 
accounted for a full understanding of the absence of parties. Athenian political leaders 
competed against each other to win voter support for their proposed polices. But they 
created neither durable associations amongst themselves to facilitate passage of 
legislation, nor formal groups to organize mass followership.  
The paper proceeds as follows. To see what insights contemporary literature offers, 
Section 2 reviews studies on the origins and reasons of existence of modern political 
parties. Section 3 summarizes the institutions of the Athenian direct democracy and 
illustrates the absence of formal political parties. Section 4 investigates explanations of 
the absence of parties. First, it discusses views of ancient historians that citizens fearing 
factionalism held common preferences. Accepting however the competitive nature of 
Athenian politics, it then investigates the causal effects of the idiosyncratic beginnings of 
the Athenian democracy, the irrelevance of public office for proposing legislation, 
appointment to public office by lot, and direct voting on single-dimension issues. Section 
5 discusses how citizens became politically informed without parties, and political 
accountability through the courts in the absence of elections for party candidates. Section 
6 concludes. 
2 The rationale for political parties 
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Boix (2007) distinguishes between two broad branches of the enormous literature on 
political parties. (a) Sociological and political history research which investigates party 
origins, types, dependence on socio-economic divisions and electoral rules (plurality or 
proportional representation). (b) Rational choice and especially spatial decision-making 
and game-theoretic models which inquire the reasons of existence of political parties, the 
influence of the electoral system on the number of parties contesting elections, and 
whether the policy positions of different parties converge or diverge. The two approaches 
are complementary. To make sense of the history of political divisions, parties and 
election outcomes, an analytical framework is required. Equally, without referring to 
historical experiences, the game-theoretic analysis cannot explain the emergence of 
actual parties or the policies they advocate.
4
 
Modern parliaments with the power to check the authority of kings appeared in England 
in the late seventeenth century (evolving from the concessions made by the king to the 
barons described in the Magna Carta of 1215) and spread slowly to Europe and America 
over the eighteenth century. Gradually, such parliaments acquired full legislative 
control.
5
 Elite parties originated in the early days of parliaments. Their members were 
local notables selected by a restricted franchise (comprising only propertied classes) with 
strong local ties, who did not need the support of a national organization to win election. 
In parliament, they formed groups sharing common interests and voted according to their 
consciences rather than party lines. 
Mass parties appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as a result of the 
extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised poorer classes of the population 
and the increasing role of the central state in regulating the industrialization process and 
in international conflicts. As parliamentary majorities grew pivotal for passing 
legislation, it became vital for the previously loose parliamentary groups with broadly 
                                                 
4
 Krouwel (2006) reviews four dimensions of parties: origin including initial formation 
and path-dependent transformation; electoral appeal to different sections of the society; ideology 
adopted to compete for electoral support; and organization, that is, the relative importance of 
party constituents, members, parliamentary group, and party members in government, party 
resources and campaigning. 
5
 See Manin (1997) for the principles and evolution of representation, and Congleton 
(2011) for a political economy account of the rise of representative government. 
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similar policy preferences, to organize into coherent, disciplined and stable units. Voters 
chose party platforms and voted for party-nominated candidates, who in parliament voted 
according to party lines.
6
  
Spatial decision models of parties start from the premise that voters vote instrumentally, 
that is, for the policy expected to maximize their net benefits. In this setting, formation of 
parties solves coordination problems between legislators in parliament and asymmetric 
information problems afflicting voters in electoral contests (since voters may remain 
rationally ignorant). Legislators operating independently of each other face collective 
action and collective choice impossibility problems (Aldrich 1995, Jackson and Moselle 
2002). The collective action problem arises when each legislator votes for bills which 
confer him the highest payoff (and rejects all others), which results in rejecting all bills 
for lack of majority. But when a majority of legislators forms a party binding them to 
cooperate, they can pass all their favorite bills increasing their payoffs. The impossibility 
problem arises when legislators face multidimensional policy choices, or they have multi-
peaked preferences over a single dimension. In these cases, a group of legislators forming 
a party can agree which policies to support and avoid cycles. The platform of their 
preferred policies may then emerge as the winning outcome. In addition, since agreeing a 
coalition is likely to involve significant transaction costs, it is sensible to form a party for 
the long-term. 
Parties as institutions which aggregate ideologically similar candidates, signal their 
preferences to imperfectly informed voters resolving a range of information and 
commitment problems. Specifically, by voting for representatives, citizens delegate 
decision-making powers to office-holders who may be better informed and enjoy relative 
                                                 
6
 Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized that mass political parties developed from socio-
economic and cultural cleavages between the centre and the periphery of the state, the state and 
the church, rural and urban interests, and, most prominently, capitalists and workers. After the 
Communist Party came to power in Russia in 1917, the division between socialism and 
communism appeared. This traditional party system started breaking down in the late 20
th
 
century, when socio-economic characteristics (social class, education, income, religiosity, region 
and gender) could no longer fully explain the pattern of support for rightwing and leftwing parties 
(Dalton 2002). New “post-material values”, pacifism, feminism, environmentalism, 
multiculturalism, became prominent, while economic globalisation pitted protest parties stressing 
national and religious values against established parties (Caramani 2011). 
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autonomy. This asymmetry generates principal-agent problems, where the representative-
agent may renege on promised policies, and pursue its material and ideological interests 
to the detriment of those of the voter-principal. Party brands, whose life spans are longer 
than those of politicians, are valuable because they discipline candidates with short 
horizons to commit credibly to platforms in the long-run interests of the electorate 
(Alesina and Spear 1988, Harrington 1992), and provide low-cost information signals 
about the preferences of candidates (Snyder and Ting 2002, Levy 2004). Further, 
politicians organized in parties exploit economies of scale in collecting information about 
voter preferences, publicizing manifestos and fighting elections (Aldridge 1995, Osborne 
and Tourky 2008).  
Contrary to instrumental voting, the expressive view of voting argues that voters vote not 
for policy gains, but for the psychological benefits from expressing their identity and 
class, which are reflected by political parties (Brennan and Hamlin 1999, Hillman 2010, 
Hamlin and Jennings 2011). Parties play the role of clubs offering a public good (shared 
ideology) for which exclusion is possible. In this light, voting for parties, resolves not 
only the problem of information cost, but also the question of who to vote for. In a 
similar vein, although not using the term expressive voting, Aachen and Bartels (2016) 
demonstrate that the great majority of citizens facing pressing every-day demands pay 
little attention to politics and remain poorly informed. Accordingly, political behavior 
and voting patterns depend on voter identity originating from attachment to social and 
psychological groups, making election outcomes mostly erratic reflections of the current 
balance of partisan loyalties.
7
   
Individual voters may also join parties as activists paying dues and engaging in activities 
to influence policy and benefit materially from being close to elected party officials (Katz 
1990; Aldrich 1983a, 1983b).
8
 Similarly, interest groups as policy demanders may form 
                                                 
7
 See Ansolabehere and Socorro Puy (2017) for the effect of identity issues on voting 
behaviour in spatial voting model. 
8
 Large numbers of party members and activists increases the probability of winning 
elections. Party members are loyal supporters and through paying membership fees and otherwise 
assisting in election campaigns they increase the resources at the disposal of the political leader, 
which again increases the probability of winning. A less tangible benefit is that party membership 
shows that the party is rooted in the society, increasing its legitimacy. 
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or back particular parties (Bawn et al 2012, Herber and Wagner 2018). In communities 
with large populations, where division of labor and knowledge are widespread and 
pervasive, and voters do not pay much attention to politics, the cost of communicating 
political ideas is high; this offers opportunities to interest groups and policy activists to 
nominate individuals who advance their policy goals, and secure rents.  
In conclusion, parties, formal and durable organizations with mass followership, resolve 
three (overlapping) problems: (1) coordination problems between individual politicians-
legislators in parliament; (2) information problems afflicting voter decisions in elections 
for candidates for office; (3) pursuit of policy and ideological demands by voters. It 
follows that parties did not emerge in ancient Athens because the Athenians had devised 
alternative solutions to those problems.  
3 The direct democracy of Athens 
3.1 Collective decision making and appointment to office 
The direct democracy of ancient Athens rose with the 508/7 reforms of Cleisthenes, an 
aristocrat who after allying himself with the common people (demos), prevailed against 
his aristocratic opponents. His reforms confirmed citizenship rights
9
 for all adult males 
residing in Attica, and allocated Athenians by lottery into ten artificial “tribes” (phylae) 




The Assembly of the Demos was the principal decision making body. It debated and 
voted on public policy issues, war and peace, public finance, foreign policy, 
infrastructure projects, festivals and public honours. All Athenian males after the age of 
twenty had the right to attend and address the Assembly. Attendance was voluntary with 
                                                 
9
 “Citizens perhaps grew out of what were at first merely the free male inhabitants of a 
polis, who owned and farmed the land; it was later that the role narrowed to become specifically 
the free males with political rights. These rights emerged from complex shifts in power and 
revolution as laws and political structures developed over the seventh and sixth centuries.” 
Thomas (2000: 56)  
10
 Lyttkens (2013) offers a rational choice account of the emergence and evolution of the 
Athenian democracy. 
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the quorum of 6,000 out of a fourth century male population of 30,000. From ten annual 
meetings in the fifth century, the Assembly met forty times a year in the second half of 
the fourth century.
11
 They voted by show of hands (with the exception of votes for 
ostracism and citizenship grants where votes were recorded), and decisions were taken by 
simple majority. In sharp contrast to modern representative government, voting for 
candidates for public office was a relatively small part of the direct Athenian democracy. 
From 501, the Assembly elected annually by show of hands the Ten Generals (Strategoi), 
one from each tribe, who served as commanders of the army and navy and performed 
related domestic and external policy duties. Hansen (1999: 235) writes: “A candidate 
from tribe I was proposed, and the people voted for or against him. The first candidate to 
get a majority was elected unless a named opponent to him was proposed, in which case 
the vote was a vote between the two of them. When no more candidates were proposed, 
the people proceeded to the next tribe, and so on.” “Hands were never counted. The 
majority was assessed by the nine proedroi [chairmen] who made their decision on a 
rough estimate (ibid: 332).” But from 440, at least one general was chosen from all tribes, 
so that at most nine were selected from different tribes. Thus, contrary to contemporary 
elected politicians who represent geographical constituencies, the Athenian Generals 
were not representing their tribes.  
Nor did the Generals act like a modern cabinet of ministers as different Generals could 
argue for different policies. For example, in 415 Alcibiades and Nicias, although 
supporting different positions regarding the fight against Sparta during the Peloponnesian 
War, were appointed co-leaders of the Sicilian campaign. In the fifth century, the political 
leaders active in the Assembly were also elected generals, but that was not the case in the 
fourth century. The reason according to Hansen (1999) was increased specialization; to 
deal with matters of war, military commanders had to be highly experienced military 
men, while orators focused on acquiring the rhetorical skills to address the Assembly.
12
 
In the mid fourth century, new four-year term elected civilian offices were introduced, 
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 Tridimas (2017) provides a public choice analysis of the frequency of Assembly 
meetings. 
12
 “… remarkably, the leading speakers served in the ranks on campaign, while the 
leading generals were mostly content to cast their vote in the Assembly like ordinary citizens and 
made as good as no attempt to speak or make proposals themselves” (Hansen, 1999: 270). 
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the treasurer of the military fund, and the board responsible for festival money 
(“theorika”). 
The Athenians appointed by lot a large number of public office-holders including the 
Council of the Five Hundred (Boule), and the panel of six thousand jurors who could 
serve in the popular courts (Heliaia). Appointment to public office by lot (sortition) from 
the eligible citizens was the hallmark of the ancient direct democracy, the true meaning 
of the rule of demos (see Tridimas 2012 and the references therein). Random selection 
offered equal opportunities to all citizens to hold public office, while election advantaged 
the rich who could afford training in public speaking and pay for liturgies (private 
finance of public services) that would make them popular. According to Aristotle: “It is 
thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected 
oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to 
have one” (Politics, Book 4, 1294b). This conception of democracy is altogether different 
from that underpinning modern representative government, where the right to vote offers 
each citizen an equal opportunity to consent to what the government decides (Manin, 
1997).  
The Council of the Five Hundred set up by the reforms of Cleisthenes in 507 met at least 
250 days a year, prepared the agenda for the Assembly of the Demos, oversaw the 
implementation of the measures passed by the Assembly, and carried out the day-to-day 
administration of the polis. The Council brought an issue to the Assembly, either for 
ratification of a specific decree already passed by its members, or as an open issue for 
discussion and vote by the Assembly. The courts were responsible for trying civil, penal, 
and political cases, and reviewing the decisions of the Assembly. They also held to 
account all magistrates before taking office checking their eligibility, during their service, 
and after completing their term. Courts met about 200 days a year. On each court day, 
2,000 jurors out of the 6,000 panel were selected by lot. After swearing the relevant oath, 
another lot allocated jurors to various trials. A normal jury numbered 501 with 201 as a 
minimum, while politically important cases could use thousands of jurors. Unlike 
Assembly attendees, jurors voted secretly without discussing the case and decided by 
simple majority.  
  10 
Further, the Athenians appointed annually by lot another six hundred magistrates to serve 
in various boards administering the city-state, religious affairs, inspection of markets and 
exchanges, roads and buildings.  
The democratic institutions were not established whole cloth; the demos assumed control 
of policy-making gradually in a number of steps over a long period. In 594, before the 
reforms of Cleisthenes, the laws of Solon enacted a variety of political and economic 
rights, which reduced the hold on power of a birth aristocracy. The democratic reforms 
culminated in 462, when the Council of Areopagus, which before the establishment of 
democracy oversaw laws and magistrates and conducted trials, was reduced to a 
homicide court for Athenian citizens. The democracy was interrupted twice. First, after a 
coup in 411 an oligarchy came to power where only five thousand Athenians retained full 
citizenship rights, but the navy restored the democracy four months later in 410. In 404 
after Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, a cruel commission of the so-called Thirty 
Tyrants established an oligarchy. The democracy was reinstated in 403 after a violent 
confrontation with the oligarchs. Various institutional reforms were then introduced. 
Most significantly, the assembly no longer passed laws describing “general norms 
without limit of duration”. This responsibility was granted to special boards of lawmakers 
(nomothetai) chosen by lot from the same panel of 6,000 jurors of the Courts (see 
Lyttkens et al. 2018). The Assembly retained the power to vote for decrees and decide 
foreign policy. 
Elected generals, councillors, magistrates and jurors of the court served annual terms and 
received a fee for their days of service, to compensate for the opportunity cost of their 
time. With thirty years the minimum age for office, Hansen (1999) estimates that during 
the fourth century the pool of eligible candidates was 20,000 citizens. No citizen could 
serve more than one term in his lifetime as a magistrate in the same office, with the 
exceptions of the Council where one could serve twice but not in successive years (but no 
term limits were placed on the generalship). Annual terms of service resulted in 
substantial rotation. Sortition implied that any citizen might hold office; rotation implied 
that every citizen might hold office at some time. Members of the Council, court jurors, 
and the various administrative magistrates were ordinary citizens, amateurs without any 
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specific training for the functions allocated to them.
13
 Their tasks were designed for non-
specialists “with reasonable intelligence and motivation” (ibid: 244) who could then 
perform them successfully. On the other hand, elections took place for appointment to 
posts requiring leadership in military or financial matters, so that citizens could choose 
those inspiring confidence for their abilities. For Ober (2008b: 98), the Athenian 
democracy “was predicated not on the legitimacy of elected leaders but on the 
assumption that value is added in political decision making via the aggregation of 
technical and social knowledge that is widely distributed within the citizenry itself.” He 
credits the institutions of direct democracy for enabling diverse and ordinary citizens to 
choose the policies that led to economic prosperity and military strength of Athens.
14
 
3.2 Absence of political parties 
There was no party alteration in government the way it is understood in modern 
democracies. Contrary to representative democracies where the government typically 
initiates legislation, in Athens citizens brought issues for discussion to the Council and 
the Assembly. Political leaders did not propose legislation in any official capacity but as 
private citizens (Hansen 1999). Talented orators and rich individuals who could afford 
training in rhetoric were the most frequent public speakers addressing the Assembly and 
the courts. An orator - political leader introducing a proposal could win or lose an 
Assembly vote, but did not win or lose political office. Annual terms and turnover of 
office holders removed the possibility of developing a class of "career politicians" or a 
specialized state bureaucracy.  
The political leaders, or orators, proposed policies, argued for their adoption, confronted 
each other in the Assembly and the courts, and aspired to receive rewards and honours as 
“protectors of the demos”. Headlam (1891: 20) wrote “It would seem that, if elections 
were fought on party lines, and if their result had a serious influence on the direction of 
the policy, we should be able to find some one or more offices which were filled by the 
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 See Fleck and Hanssen (2012) for the lack of expertise in the Athenian legal system. 
14
 Nippel (2015) assesses the impact of the Athenian democracy on the Western political 
thought and institutions; Cartledge (2016) analyzes the birth of democratic political thought in 
ancient Greece. 
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heads of the party, who in consequence of their election would be for a period the 
recognised leaders of the state.” Hammond (1988) argues it is misleading to use party 
labels to characterize Athenian politics because of the immediacy of contact between 
political leaders and people. In the Assembly, each political leader acted individually 
arguing for his preferred policy and “if they formed partnerships, they did so on an ad 
hoc basis and readily dissolved them” (ibid 521). Similarly, Osborne (2010: 29) 
concludes “Athens had nothing like a party system, and although scholars occasionally 
suspect that a member of the Council was acting as a frontman for a more prominent 
individual, it seems unlikely that this happened in any systematic way.” 
Hansen (1999: 277-288) conjectures that at any given time the number of active orators 
was about twenty, and in the period 403–322 there were fewer than a hundred. He 
contends that the orators did have associates, followers, friends and admirers, and as a 
matter of necessity, they occasionally collaborated with each other to advance common 
interests in the Assembly and the courts. These loose associations were perhaps the 
closest analogues to political parties. After a careful reading of the extant sources, 
Hansen (2014) concludes that there existed small sets of political leaders but their 
groupings lacked formality, durability and organizational structure to be recognised as 
political parties. In the ancient society, exchanges were personal and localized. Political 
leaders were able to control small scores of voters, but political parties, in the sense of 
organizations with formal rules, registered members or distinct ideological labels were 
absent from all settings where voting took place (the Assembly, the Council and the 
courts). Men with political ambitions joined other men of influence, which made 
Athenian political life depend on interpersonal relationships rather than ideology or party 
organization (Worthington 2013). 
Groups of aristocrats wishing to overthrow the democracy (temporarily successful in 411 
and 404), was arguably the closest that Athens experienced to informal political parties. 
They espoused a constitutional agenda, but were far from being political parties. In the 
extant sources, the word “hetaireia” often appears to describe groups of supporters of 
  13 
political leaders.
15
 Hansen (1999: 277–287) warns that it is best to translate the word 
describing the group of followers, hetaireia, or hetairikon, as “comrades association” 
instead of party. Forsdyke (2005: p.85) describes hetaireia as “a group of wealthy and 
powerful men, who were not necessarily related by blood.” Similarly, Brock (2013: 
3196) defines hetereia as “informal grouping of upper-class males who engage jointly in 
warfare and politics and meet socially in the symposion [drinking party].”  Hansen (2014) 
argues that hetaireia refers to oligarchs who attempted to overthrow the democracy
16
; 
they were neither formal nor long-lasting organizations. He concludes that such groups 
were like clubs based on kinship and personal friendship.  
There was always the risk that speakers addressing the Assembly could be shouted down 
by coordinated efforts of supporters of rival political leaders. To counteract this, a law of 
346/5 prescribed that in Assembly meetings all members of one tribe, selected by lot 
before the session would sit at the front of the auditorium (Hansen 2014 offers details), so 
that no group of followers of a political leader would be able to heckle or interrupt a rival 
orator. Further, looking specifically at the Council of Five Hundred, Hansen (ibid) points 
to a law of 410/9 which assigns seats to the councillors by lot. He comments (392-393): 
“The reason … must have been that the Athenians wanted to thwart a tendency among 
the councillors to seat themselves in political groups … it is worth noting that [the law] 
was passed in the year when democracy was restored after the regime of the 400 and the 
5000 [coup of 411]. Before the restoration the Council had been controlled by a faction of 
oligarchically-minded citizens (Thuc. 8.66.1–2) who probably sat together in the 
bouleuterion. The reinstated democrats would put a stop to such practices.” 
We conclude that even if the presence of parties is not a binary variable but one of 
gradation according to the level of formal organization, durability and ideological label, it 
is still fair to say that at the very least, Athenian political groupings which harboured 
ambitions to change the constitution had neither formal organization nor permanent 
structure nor detailed political objectives.  
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 See, Homer, Iliad, 16.168; Herodotus, Histories, 5.66.2, 5.71.1; and Aristotle, Athenian 
Constitution, 20.1. 
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 “...a law of 410–404 prescribed that an eisangelia [impeachment] should be brought 
against anyone who tries to overthrow the democracy or form a ἑταιρικόν.” (ibid: 383) 
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4 Explaining the absence of political parties  
4.1 Homogeneous citizenry and political consensus  
A small body of previous work by ancient historians attributed the absence of political 
parties to the relative homogeneity of the Athenian citizen body. Osborne (2010) 
maintains that from an early age the Athenians engaged in a multitude of face-to-face 
activities fostering the idea that they all espoused the same principles and practices. This 
strengthened a sense of community among the politically active male citizens, while 
simultaneous exclusion from citizenship of women, resident-aliens and slaves resulted in 
a more homogeneous electorate.  
Ober (2008b) argues that the Athenians shared an overriding preference to be powerful 
and defend against endemic existential risks from both external and internal enemies. A 
Greek city-state confronted a 1:3 chance of destruction from an external enemy (ibid: 82). 
During the Archaic Era 750–500, Athens had to cope with various invasions and faced 
Megara, a hostile neighbour. In 480, just before the victory in the sea battle of Salamis, 
the invading Persians sacked Athens. After the 404 defeat in the Peloponnesian War, 
Athens had to surrender its navy and demolish the defensive Long Walls. As already 
described, the internal enemies overthrew the democracy twice, in 411 and in 404. Ober 
claims that consensus in favor of Athenian power superseded all differences leading to “a 
general lack of fixed ideological commitments of the sort that sustain a system of 
organized political parties” (2008b: 101, emphasis in the original). This argument is in 
the tradition of fear of factions as a threat to popular sovereignty.
17
 Until the emergence 
of the modern representative government in the nineteenth century, political thinkers 
wrestling with the fear that one faction may prevail over another, control government and 
tyrannize its opponents, searched for institutions to balance factions. Contrary to the 
latter, North et al (2009, Chapter 6) argue that political parties as impersonal 
organizations made up of a multitude of factions of political and economic interests 
signaled the arrival of modern open access to politics and economics. 
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 Hofstadter (1969) stresses the importance of consensus for the founding fathers and the 
early history of the United States. 
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Hansen (2014) attributes the absence of parties to the direct democracy per se, but does 
not offer a causal mechanism. He cites Swiss Landsgemeinden (annual assembly of the 
citizens of a canton) as a modern example of direct democracy without parties. In 
Landsgemeinden meetings party politics practically dissolve; voters neither sit in groups 
according to party affiliation nor do they vote on party lines. He also considers the laws 
against group formation by political leaders and their followers as corroborating reason 
for the absence of parties. 
Nevertheless, even if a general consensus about strong defense prevailed, important 
differences regarding how to achieve it cannot be ruled out. Differences remained about 
taxes to finance defense. For Jones (1957: 131) different socio-economic interests led to 
different patterns of voting: “there was a broad distinction of outlook between the 
propertied classes and the poor. Aristotle thought that he could discern this distinction 
throughout Athenian political history, and he is not likely to have been entirely wrong. In 
domestic affairs, it is difficult to trace it. There was no overt oligarchical party... The 
distinction can be most clearly discerned in foreign policy which of course involved 
finance. On a number of occasions, in 396 [according to the] historian Oxyrhynchus, and 
on Alexander's death [according to] Diodorus, we are told that the propertied classes 
favoured peace or appeasement, while the poor were more bellicose. Aristophanes [in 
“Ecclesiazusae” 197 18] declares: “Is there talk of equipping a fleet? The poor man says, 
yes, but the rich citizen and the countryman say, no.’ But this merely means that people 
tended to vote according to their economic interests.” Economou and Kyriazis (2016) 
also show that rich and poor Athenians had different policy preferences, respectively, 
pro-peace and pro-war, and expansive programs of public works offering job 
opportunities to the poor won majority support. Nevertheless, differences in birth, wealth 
or policy preferences, did not give rise to political parties. 
The argument that there were no parties because of ‘fear of faction’ may not explain fully 
the absence of parties from the antagonistic environment of ancient Athens. If parties 
arise endogenously in competitive politics, and political competition was present in 
                                                 
18
 See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0029%3Acard%3D169 
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Athens, it is essential to investigate why neither political leaders nor voters saw any 
benefits in founding, joining, or voting for political parties.  
4.2 Initial conditions 
Boix (2007) alludes to an important asymmetry between early and later stages of 
electoral politics. At the initial step, there is little information about voter preferences and 
the stage is fluid; as a result early entrants may be able to shape the form of the electoral 
competition to suit their interests. This implies that if parties were absent from the contest 
for popular support at the crucial juncture of the beginning of democratization of Athens, 
other things being equal, they were unlikely to develop endogenously.  
In ancient Greece, assemblies where the rulers, members of the aristocratic elite, 
addressed ordinary warriors were common from the archaic times, if not earlier, although 
decision making power was in the hands of the rulers. Steadily, the ordinary warriors 
became economically and militarily more powerful and acquired full citizenship rights. 
Citizenship, a most important conceptual development in the ancient Greek political 
thought and practice, meant that all locally born free men within a city-state had equal 
political rights and enjoyed legal protections, regardless of wealth, birth, education, or 
other factors, combined with obligations to serve the community. Citizens decided by 
simple majority. Introduced probably in the seventh century, simple majority voting was 
the result of new development in hoplite warfare technology (Pitsoulis 2011). Counting 
the number of men armed with spears instead of actually fighting and awarding victory to 
the side with the largest tally reduced significantly the cost of conflict.  
The Athenian transition to democracy, like the gradual political liberalization of the 
West, took place in stages. We may distinguish a number of stages, namely, the reforms 
of Solon, the reforms of Cleisthenes, which secured the right all (male) Athenians to 
attend and vote in the Assembly, and finally the extension of the right to serve in public 
office to the poorest classes in the 460s, introduced by the reforms of Ephialtes and 
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Pericles.
19
 No political parties formed to advance those changes. As already said, 
Cleisthenes prevailed against his aristocratic rivals after “allying himself with the 
common people”. Furthermore, unlike representative democracies whose electorates were 
divided in geographical constituencies, Cleisthenes set up Athens as a single constituency 
to end previous political divisions which were based on geographical divisions. As a 
result, neither delegates were elected to represent local interests nor proto-parties were 
formed as alliances of local political leaders in the Assembly. Path dependence was 
crucial: since at the initial steps of democracy the empowered demos decided policy 
directly, a change towards conducting policy through delegates organized in parties 
became unlikely. Headlam (1891: 34) makes this point implicitly: “The prejudice against 
party organisations was a necessary consequence of the principle that the demos must 
govern.” We proceed to explore the institutions of the direct democracy which made 
parties superfluous.  
4.3 Irrelevance of public office to propose legislation 
Any citizen who so wished (ho voulomenos), could propose a policy, and those 
sufficiently concerned did so.
20
 Occupying public office was irrelevant to proposing 
legislation. The Athenian political leaders controlled policy making because they were 
able to argue convincingly and win the Assembly vote, not because they were voted to 
office.  Ober (2008b: 164) considers the political leaders who spoke to the Assembly as 
“advisers”, “men possessing some expert knowledge of both the matter at hand and 
rhetorical technique.” In Xenophon’s Memorabilia Book 3.6, Socrates illustrates to a 
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 They mirror the rise of the middle and lower classes: Cleisthenes’ reforms empowered 
the middle class farmers-infantrymen, and the naval program of Themistocles of 483-2 
empowered the poorest class of thetes who served in the navy underscoring Athenian military 
power; see Kyriazis and Zouboulakis (2004). 
20
 Two examples from the fifth and fourth century illustrate this. Davies (1993, pp. 54-57) 
discusses a document, dated ca. 450, where following a public funds embezzlement scandal, the 
Council proposed certain measures. Thespieus and Lysanias, two otherwise unknown citizens, 
speaking from the floor persuaded the Assembly to accept amendments creating an administrative 
board to deal with that particular scandal, future finance and the payment of the board members. 
Second, in 375/4, proposed by an otherwise unknown Nicophon, a law on money purity and 
circulation of good silver coins was passed, which provided for all foreign coins with the correct 
silver content to circulate in the Athenian economy along with Athenian silver coins; see Engen 
(2005), and Ober (2008b). 
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young aspiring politician that mere eloquence would not make him a successful adviser. 
Instead, he needed to develop expertise in the sources and sizes of the revenues and 
expenses of the city-state, its military and naval strength and that of its enemies, whether 
the annual production of home-grown wheat could feed Athens and how much more was 
required. Nowhere does Socrates advise him to form a party or join existing parties. This 
silence is deafening. With public office inconsequential for political influence, ambitious 
individuals who in modern times would have joined political parties to pursue their 
ideological causes could do so by winning Assembly votes. These observations go a long 
way to explain the small number of ancient references to elections, and the complete 
absence of references to today’s ubiquitous office of prime minister or president. Nor did 
“interest groups” need to pursue their policy interests by supporting a party. Individuals 
could propose their favourite measures directly to the Assembly, or ask one of the active 
political leaders to promote its cause.  
The right of any citizen to propose a policy opened agenda setting to all. Modern 
collective choice theory suggests that this effective absence of monopoly in agenda 




4.4 Appointment to public office by lot 
Politicians in office have significant patronage power and may appoint their supporters to 
public posts. However, Athenian political leaders had no authority to make appointments 
to public offices because the latter were allocated by lot among the eligible (and willing) 
citizens, which also strongly discouraged the development of clientelistic relations 
between politicians-as-patrons and voters-as-clients. That is, sortition enabled citizens to 
occupy public office and receive a fee for service without political partisanship or 
personal connections with political patrons. Those interested in holding public posts had 
no incentive to receive nomination by political parties, for affiliation to a party could not 
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 As Tsebelis (2018: 89) notes in connection to misgivings about modern referendums, 
“the most important variable in a referendum is the identity of the agenda setter, and the people 
cannot enjoy the benefits of the procedure unless we eliminate the agenda setting monopoly from 
governments (in the case of plebiscites) or interest groups (in the case of popular initiatives).”  
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affect the probability of holding office. Nor did serving in public office offer permanent 
occupation as office rotation occurred annually. Similarly, since the outcome of the lot 
was unpredictable, it was impossible for a political party to advance its interests by 
appointing supporters to public posts.  
The irrelevance of holding office for proposing policy, sortition and rotation in public 
office diminished the incentive to set up parties to control the legislative or executive 
arms, which in turn discouraged corruption of magistrates. However, these factors do not 
explain why political leaders did not form parties as formal and binding alliances to 
pursue common policy objectives in the Assembly. 
4.5 Single dimension voting  
Since voters care about several issues, modern elections are fought over multiple policy 
dimensions. As already explained, in the multi-dimension setting, parties are formed to 
offer combinations of policies not available in their absence; this in turn may resolve 
problems of cycling (Aldridge 1995) and may generate policy platforms which are 
preferred to the Condorcet winner in pair wise comparisons (Levy 2004). However, in the 
direct democracy of Athens, Assembly voters voted on each item debated, instead of 
platforms bundling several issues.  
Hansen (1999: 156) calculates that in the 82 year period 404-322, about 3,000 Assembly 
meetings took place passing about 30,000 decrees. Although detailed quantitative 
information is lacking, Hansen argues that the most important field of action was foreign 
policy including declarations of war and peace, alliances, sending of envoys, army and 
navy mobilization and finance of expeditions. Other fields included public works and 
their finance, religion and festivals and honorary decrees passed to recognize those 
contributing to Athens. With such a large number of decisions, we may presume that no 
bundling took place. Voting was on single dimension as assembly-goers decided 
separately on foreign policy, finance of public projects and so on, instead of platforms 
combining several of them. Deciding on each separate issue instead of platforms is a 
crucial qualitative advantage of direct relative to representative democracy. 
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Some issues must have been uncontroversial and easily and quickly dealt with. A few 
more issues were simple binary choices, as for example when granting citizenship to a 
non-Athenian or bestowing a public honor to an individual. In those cases, the Condorcet 
theorem applied.
22
 No parties could have emerged under these circumstances.  
Other issues however must have been debated long and hard. As is well known from 
public choice theory, if voting is on a single dimension and preferences are single-
peaked, the median voter's ideal point wins against all other policy points in pairwise 
voting (Mueller 2003). In a single-dimension, any party comprising politicians only to the 
left or to the right of the median cannot win against the median. When politicians to the 
left and to the right are members of the same party, they cannot find a position which is 
preferable to the median and their coalition is unstable. It follows that if a median voter 
equilibrium existed, the Assembly would have reached it without the intermediation of 
political parties.
23
 Politicians forming parties would confront costs without a 
commensurate increase in payoffs. More specifically, if before voting, political leaders 
can identify long and predominant social divisions, they may react by forming political 
parties, which reflect such divisions. However, if the electorate is divided along several 
and changing issues, formation of long-lasting political parties may not be viable. When 
it is possible to vote on any single issue, the number of divisions among citizens is 
extremely large; every single issue may generate a different coalition of interests. This 
implies that Assembly voting on each policy item made impossible the emergence of 
stable, organized groups with common, long-standing interests, or coherent ideology, or 
aims to share the spoils of power. As a result, if a median voter equilibrium existed, the 
Assembly would reach it without voting for political parties; in the direct democracy 
political parties were superfluous.  
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 The Condorcet jury theorem states that if a group of imperfectly informed individuals 
faced with two alternatives, one of which is correct, uses simple majority voting, the accuracy of 
the group decision increases with the size of the group; see Mueller (2003). See McCannon 
(2011) for the application of the theorem to Athenian juries. 
23
 Athenian voting outcome are formally characterized as median voter equilibrium, see 
Levy (1989), McCannon (2010), Fleck and Hansen (2012) and Tridimas (2012, 2015 and 2016). 
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There is corroborating evidence from modern party politics that “unbundling” policy 
issues reduces the primacy of political parties. There may be issues, which cause deep 
intra-party splits across the traditional Left-Right spectrum, and are impossible to resolve 
through parliamentary party politics like a state’s EU membership; such issues are often 
resolved by calling a referendum (Matsusaka 2005, Tridimas 2007, Tierney 2012).
24
 It 
follows that if there are issues which cause intra-party divisions, the parties may dissolve. 
These theoretical considerations also formalize Hansen’s (2014) intuition that party 
politics disappear in a direct democracy.  
However, the validity of the median voter equilibrium rests crucially on the assumption 
that voter preferences are single peaked. How often this was the case is a separate inquiry 
left for future research. 
5 Voter information and political accountability without political parties 
Without elections for party candidates, how did the Athenian democracy solve problems 
of information about policy issues and accountability of politicians?  
5.1 A well-informed citizen body  
The direct democracy provided many opportunities for the demos to become efficiently 
informed about policy issues without the intermediation of political parties. Given short 
terms of service, annual rotation in office, and large frequency of Assembly meetings, the 
citizens who served in the Council, the magistracies, the courts, and attended the 
Assembly must have been well informed and sufficiently experienced to perform the 
roles expected of them by the participatory democracy. Hansen (1999: 249) calculates 
that in the 4
th
 century, out of 20,000 eligible citizens the rule that a man could serve in the 
Council of Five Hundred no more than twice in his life implied that “over a third of all 
citizens over eighteen, and about two thirds of all citizens over forty, became councilors, 
some of them twice”. This is a staggering figure of politically active citizens in 
comparison to representative democracies.  
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 This also implies that modern referendums are complements of representative 
democracy rather than a return to the Athenian democratic constitution. 
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Ober (2008b) explains that without resorting to centralized coercive arrangements the 
Athenians solved successfully problems of information asymmetry and coordination by 
relying on the dispersed knowledge of different citizens. The direct democracy with the 
frequent face-to-face engagements placed the management of the state in the hands of 
numerous small teams as well as larger networks of citizen-amateurs who learnt basic 
routines and when needed could access expert knowledge. Meeting in the Assembly, 
Council, courts and boards, participating in tribal, municipal and state rituals, and serving 
in the military enabled the Athenians, both formally and informally, to share information, 
learn from each other, accumulate knowledge, and foster innovation.  
The antidosis (property exchange) procedure illustrates an ingenious way to extract and 
verify information in the public interest: A nominee for a trierarchy liturgy (pay for 
outfitting and maintaining a trireme for a year) could challenge another rich citizen, either 
to undertake the expense or to exchange property with the nominee who would then pay. 
The defender could accept the liturgy, or exchange property, or ask a court to adjudicate. 
In front of hundreds-strong juries, the disputants tried to show each one’s true wealth to 
avoid paying. The objective of antidosis was to ensure that those who actually were 
wealthy, rather than those who seemed to be wealthy, would pay with the burden of proof 
falling on the private actors rather than the state. From a modern perspective, antidosis 
sought efficient public good provision, voluntary finance of public goods, and budgetary 
balance (Kaiser 2007). 
Publicity, dissemination of information to citizens at different locations and occupations, 
took place through a variety of media. These included oath taking, participation in public 
rituals and building distinct public monuments, which became low-cost information 
conduits. Oath taking (by soldiers, jurors and magistrates) in front of witnesses signalled 
credible commitment to act for the cause (defence, justice, etc.) Rituals are 
manifestations of culture, the set of beliefs about how nature and society work and the 
related norms of behaviour. Participation in public rituals, sacrifices, athletic and artistic 
competitions, built common knowledge and enhanced coordination of actions. Public 
monuments in prominent positions and of distinctive architecture, temples, statues, 
columns (stele), acted as “focal points” and reminders of shared values and history. The 
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central agora was officially designed as an open public space for citizens to congregate, 
talk and do business. Statutes were inscribed on prominently displayed columns for all to 
see. The architecture of inward-facing circle, as in theatres and other public meeting 
places, allowed spectators both to observe the speaker at centre-stage and make extensive 
eye contact with each other, thus gaining insight on the reception of speeches.
25
 Without 
loudspeakers or paper for writing, such means undoubtedly reduced the cost of 
transmitting information building common knowledge. 
It follows that the Athenians were well informed about policy issues and could make up 
their minds, reducing inter alia reliance on political parties. This is not to idealize them 
or say that they were perfectly informed. As discussed, political intermediation did take 
place. Ability to collect and process information and offer solutions on policy issues were 
prominent qualities for an individual to emerge as a political leader. Further, as it is clear 
from forensic speeches, the orators appealed to the citizens not only on proposed policies 
but also on valence issues, like character and personal achievements, which also indicates 
lack of perfect information about policy issues. 
5.2 Political accountability through the courts 
In modern democracies, electing or rejecting candidates for office is an effective 
mechanism to discipline politicians. In view of the lack of partisan elections for office, 
how did the Athenians hold political leaders to account? During the fifth century, 
ostracism, introduced by Cleisthenes, offered such a mechanism. A special Assembly 
vote could send a political leader to exile for ten years removing him from active politics 
but without any additional financial sanction or other punishment. The Athenians used 
the mechanism sparingly, with ten attested ostracisms in the period 507–416.26 During 
the fourth century, the graphe paranomon (suit for illegality) replaced ostracism. 
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 It bears noting that “The construction and improvement of monumental inward-facing 
public buildings in Athens begins with the emergence of democracy [508], continues through the 
period of democratic flourishing, and ends abruptly with the end of the democracy [322]” (Ober 
2008b: 202-3). 
26
 Forsdyke (2005) surveys the evidence from the sources and modern scholarship on 
ostracism. Tridimas (2016) offers a game theoretic analysis of the process and the variance of its 
use over time. 
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According to this procedure, any citizen could apply to the courts for annulling a decree 
passed by the Assembly for being contrary to the laws (general permanent rules applying 
to all individuals), and punish its proposer. If the court found the proposer guilty, it could 
hand a severe penalty, including heavy fines and loss of political rights. The process was 
used with high frequency. Hansen (1999: 208) claims “jurors must have judged a graphe 
paranomon something like once every month”, which for the period 403–322 and for the 
administrative year divided into ten periods implies a sum of eight hundred.
27
 
As first noted by Headlam (1891), lack of partisanship in elections for candidates 
explains to a large degree the persistent recourse of the Athenian politicians to the law 
courts for injuring their opponents. “These political trials were really an opportunity for 
the expression of popular favour or distrust...And so we find that every decided change in 
Athenian policy is marked, not by the election of a new finance minister, or a new board 
of generals, but by the condemnation in the law courts of the former protector of the 
demos (ibid: 36).”28 On this reading, political leaders were not necessarily brought to trial 
because they were guilty of illegal acts, but because the trial offered the citizenry in its 
capacity as jurors the opportunity to approve or disapprove a political leader. Further, the 
use of the courts in political disputes provides an additional explanation for the 
observations that in the fourth century orators rather than generals dominated politics.   
It is finally important to reiterate a feedback loop from the absence of political parties to 
the majority voting rule. Absence of political parties negates the need to choose an 
electoral law, which would aggregate votes and allocate seats in the legislature to party 
candidates. Thus, majority voting emerges as an obvious rule to decide the election 
winner in an election concerning policies rather than candidates. More generally, direct 
participatory policy making under majority voting, sortition, accountability to the courts 
and the absence of political parties comprised an integral structure and none of those 
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 The principle behind the graphe paranomon was that the people by definition were 
never wrong, so if the Assembly took a bad decision, it must have been because the citizens had 
received bad advice from someone who ought to be punished when found out. See Lyttkens et al. 
(2018) who also compare ostracism with graphe paranomon.  
28
 The long-running animosity between Demosthenes and Aeschines (fourth century) is a 
good example in case; see Worthington (2013). 
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institutions could operate independently of each other. Majority voting in the Assembly 
implied that all citizens carried the same weight in deciding issues of public interest, 
manifesting in practice equality of political rights and political power (respectively 
isonomy and isocratia, Hansen 1999: 81). The latter went hand-in-hand with the right to 
hold public office made effective by random selection and rotation. In turn, selection by 
lot obviated the intermediation of political parties and strengthened the primacy of the 
Assembly. 
6 Conclusions 
Political parties inform voters on issues of public policy, fight elections on multi-
dimension policy platforms, nominate candidates for office, who when elected choose 
policy. Ubiquitous in modern representative democracies, they were absent from the 
direct, participatory and deliberative democracy of ancient Athens. Previous scholarship 
attributed the absence of parties to a homogenous citizenry favouring congruence to 
antagonism. On the contrary, the present study focused on the absence of parties in 
competitive politics.  
The premise of the Athenian democracy was the supremacy of the demos in deciding 
policy and equality of opportunities for citizens to hold public office. In practice these 
were manifested by debate and vote in the Assembly, sortition with rotation in office, and 
scrutiny by the courts. In so far as initial circumstances condition later developments, 
parties were unlikely to emerge because they were absent at the launch of the democracy 
when the Assembly took direct control in a single constituency and adopted simple 
majority voting. Since citizens rather than elected officials initiated legislation, political 
leaders had to win the Assembly votes on policy issues rather than election to office.  
Selection to public office for routine administrative tasks by the luck of the draw and 
annual rotation diminished motives for partisan control of those appointments. Compared 
to modern representative democracies, these factors minimized the incentives for political 
leaders and voters alike to coalesce in parties. However, they did not eliminate possible 
gains that political leaders could had from coordination in passing legislation. That the 
latter did not materialize is attributed to single dimension voting by the Assembly using 
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the simple majority rule. It nullified their incentives to form permanent alliances for 
preparing manifestos combining different policy dimensions, and for passing legislation. 
Finally, the participatory democracy filled the role of informing citizens about policy 
issues, while the courts held political leaders into account. These conclusions are not a 
call for reforming representative government; nevertheless, they show that democracy 
operated successfully without political parties. 
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